Cornell Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 4 Summer 1949

Article 2

Weary Erie
Arthur John Keeffe
John J. Gilhooley
George H. Bailey
Donald S. Day

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Arthur John Keeffe, John J. Gilhooley, George H. Bailey, and Donald S. Day, Weary Erie, 34 Cornell L. Rev. 494 (1949)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol34/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

WEARY ERIE
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE, JOHN J. GILHOOLEY, GEORGE H.
AND DONALD

BAILEY

S. DAY

It is the epigram that impresses. Glib reference to the rule in Shelley's
Case, the Deep Rock doctrine, the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, is convenient and reassuring. Only ten years have passed since the reversal
of Swift v. Tyson,' but already the "rule of Erie v. Tompkins"2 is established doctrine. It has run like wildfire through the whole field of
federal practice. In almost every federal court opinion these days, there
is a pontifical reference to the "rule of Erie v. Tompkins." Like Caesar's
wife, it is above suspicion.' The multitude of references indicate that
Erie v. Tompkins is now a matter of pure faith.
At the risk of being burned for heresy, we do not think that the
gospel of Erie stands the test of objective analysis.
The desirability of a rule which guarantees both uniformity and
certainty is beyond question.' Yet recently, there have been faint rumblings of discontent directed at applications and interpretations of the
Erie doctrine.5 Is it possible that the evils complained of lie not in the
fruit, but in the seed-that the fundamental difficulty stems from the
creation rather than the application? We think that the broad policy
formulated by the Supreme Court in reversing Swift v. Tyson was based
upon a misconception of the problems involved in diversity litigation.
From the moment of its inception, the Erie v. Tompkins panacea was
destined for chaos.
I
The facts in the Erie case were simple. One dark night, Tompkins,
a Pennsylvania resident, while walking along a right of way, was hit
by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad, a New York corporation.
Tompkins brought a negligence action in the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The Erie Railroad contended that
since the tort occurred in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law should govern,
and accordingly, the only duty owed to Tompkins was to refrain from
1

16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
2 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
3 IV CLOUGH, PLUTARCH'S WORKS 266 (1891). "I wished my wife to be not so much
as suspected," replied Caesar, as the reason for divorcing his wife.
4 Most reviews of the case at the time of its decision subscribed to the Court's result,
directing their criticism to the manner in which the result had been reached. See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L. J. 1336 (1938).
5 Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 Ky. L. J.
99 (1943); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267 (1945); Cook, The Federal Corts and the Conflict of
Laws, 36 ILL. L. REV. 493 (1942); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L. J.
762 (1941).
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gross negligence. The district court, however, awarded Tompkins judgment. It relied on Swift v. Tyson, ruling that the responsibility of a
railroad for injuries caused by its servants was a question of general
law, upon which, in the absence of a local statute, the federal courts
were free to exercise their independent judgment. Though the holdings
of the Pennsylvania courts were persuasive, they were not binding. The
district court applied the general rule that where the public has made
open and notorious use of a railroad right of way for a long period of
time, the railroad owes the duty of "ordinary care" to those using the
permissive pathway. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.' The Supreme Court
undertook review by certiorari, and on April 25, 1938, the opinion was
rendered.7 Mr. Justice Brandeis began: "The question for decision is
whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved." 8 Six of the eight judges answered yes, and a rule which for
nearly a century had been imbedded in federal jurisprudence was
committed to a judicial grave. Just the day before, federal courts
exercising jurisdiction on grounds of diversity of citizenship had
been required to apply only the statutes of the state, the state tribunals'
construction of those statutes, and state decisions on matters of law
peculiarly local. On questions of a more general nature, though the
state decisions had been entitled to the highest attention and respect, the
federal courts had been free to determine independently what the law
was or should be. Now, the federal judge was bound to follow both the
statutes and decisions of the state even though the particular state rule
conflicted with that of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. The
coup was complete. Swift v. Tyson was dead. At that instant, federal
judges became automatons, and the push-button an integral part of
the judicial process.
What reasons were offered in justification for such an astounding turnabout?
First: In Swift v. Tyson, Mr. Justice Story had erroneously interpreted § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. That section provided:
"... the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,

treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
(Italics added).'
6 90 F. 2d 603 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
7 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
8 Id. at 69.
9 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1928), as amended, 62 STAT. A 101, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1652 (1948).
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"Laws" meant unwritten as well as written, judicial as well as statutory;
Mr. Charles Warren, in his recent research, had so "established." 1
It was true that Warren had uncovered evidence that affected the
interpretation of § 34. As originally drafted by Oliver Ellsworth, it had
read, "the Statute law of the several states ... and their unwritten and
common law... ." Warren established that the word "laws" had been
substituted for that phrase; he concluded that the alteration was one
of form-not of substance.
Was that conclusion inescapable? Was it not possible that the substitution was intended to change the meaning of the statute? Moreover, assuming that Warren's interpretation of Ellsworth's intent was
correct, did it necessarily follow that Congress had a like intent? Obviously these questions cannot be answered with confidence; they are at
least debatable." As a matter of fact, Professor Goodnow was convinced from a study of the state constitutional conventions that there
was nothing to indicate an intention to deprive the United States courts
of traditional judicial powers.1 2 Mr. Justice Holmes thought that Mr.
Warren's work demonstrated that Story "probably was wrong,"" while
to the dissenting Mr. Justice Butler, it was no more than "suggestive."' 4
But to Mr. Justice Brandeis, both the fact and the deduction had been
"established," even though there had been no argument by counsel on
the point. It would seem that the Court's determination of statutory
interpretation without unequivocal supporting authority and without
argument was, at best, evidence of a pre-conceived design to destroy an
undesired judicial policy, the design to be effected whether the occasion
was suitable for the task or not.' 5
Second: Almost as an apology for this unprecedented departure from
10 " . . the word 'laws' in this Section 34 was not intended to be confined to 'statute
laws,' as judge Story held in the famous case of Swift v. Tyson, but was intended to
include the common law of a State as well as the statute law." Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. Rav. 49, 52 (1923).
11 McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts, 33
ILL. L. REV. 126 (1938).
12 "We may therefore conclude that there was nothing said in the conventions, state
or national, which either framed or adopted the United States constitution, clearly
indicating that those responsible for that instrument intended to deprive either the new
courts of the function . . . to lay down the laws applicable to the cases before them
where this had not been determined by legislative authority, or to take away from Congress the legislative power to determine the law to be applied by the United States courts."
mOaM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 (1911).
GooDNow, SociAL RE
13 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 535 (1928)

(dissenting opinion).

14 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 86 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
15 This view has been stated by others. "We may guess that the venerable but determined justice had made up his mind that without waiting for the gradual process
of corrosion, a suitable occasion should be seized to destroy root and branch the heresy
of 'general law'." McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the
Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 132

(1938).
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a fundamental theory of federal jurisprudence, the Court said: "If only
a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a
century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been
made clear and compels us to do so."' 6 This statement has conservatively been dubbed the Achilles heel of the opinion.
It is difficult to determine exactly what was unconstitutional about
the Tyson doctrine. Unquestionably Article III of the Constitution
designates the federal courts as proper forums to litigate suits between
"Citizens of different States."'" Given jurisdiction, it would logically
follow that a federal court would have the constitutional power to determine the controversy by any reasonable method. The choice of
"federal common law" rather than the law of a particular state is clearly not so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional.
Unquestionably, Justice Brandeis was of the opinion that Swift v.
Tyson did not promote uniformity. 9 He also believed that the doctrine
encouraged "shopping for jurisdiction."2 But this issue involves only
a legislative choice of policy, and the awkward attempt to raise it to
the dignity of a "constitutional question" seems no more than a makeweight intended to buttress a weak position.
Indeed the very assertion of a constitutional argument seems somewhat surprising. Especially so, when we recall that neither party had
raised the issue and that in the Ashwander case 2 Justice Brandeis himself contended that the Court should "refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so . . ., when
the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise
it."'22 The constitutional argument should be recognized for what it is
-an attempt to bolster a questionable decision and build the new
practice of conformity on a principle so wide and deep that it would be
difficult to overturn.
Third: Although the Brandeis opinion professes to rest the Erie v.
Tompkins decision upon both a constitutional issue and a question of
statutory construction, the problem was essentially one of policy. Instinct within the decision is the opinion that the Swift v. Tyson doctrine
16 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
17 McCormick v. Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts, 33
ILL. L. REV. 126, 134 (1938).

18 U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish." U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power shall
extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States .
19 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74 (1938).

20 Id. at 75-77.
21 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
22 Id. at 341 (concurring opinion).

"
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did not properly balance the interaction of two basic judicial considerations. The court believed that the doctrine unduly sacrificed the advantage of having one settled body of law obtain in any geographical
area in favor of a flexible and unfettered judicial process. It argued
that the possibility of two courts within one state arriving at opposite
results was confusing and unjust.3 The Court admitted the advantage
of national uniformity but urged that the doctrine had not effectively
accomplished that end.24
Thus, the Erie v. Tompkins decision stands or falls upon two premises:
(1) that the Swift v. Tyson doctrine promoted injustice and (2) failed
to achieve national uniformity.
A critical examination of all the cases decided under Swift v. Tyson
would seem to be most scientific way to test the validity of these
premises. In order to delimit an otherwise insuperable task, a specific
group of cases were chosen for the inquiry. No test could be more
severe than an analysis of the cases cited by Justice Brandeis in the
Erie case, those cases upon which his heaviest artillery was brought to
bear and upon whose ruins the foundation of the Erie doctrine was
laid.
First, did Swift v. Tyson promote injustice?' Was the possibility of
diverse holdings within one state as insidious as the Court supposed?
A total of forty-eight cases cited by Justice Brandeis were reviewed
and the following summarizes the result:
1) In eight cases, the Swift v. Tyson doctrine was not invoked
or was not applicable. Of the eight, four cases were readily distinguishable from those previously before the state courts; 26

two

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 77 (1938).
Id. at 74.
At the outset, it should be recognized that any classification of decisions as "fair"
or "unfair" is subject to criticism. Even the experienced trial judge, who is most familiar
with the ingredients of a particular suit, often finds it difficult to determine "natural
equities." However, since the Erie v. Tompkins decision rests at least in part on that
type of analysis, our attempt at a similar classification seems justified. Cf. Schofield,
Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal Courts, 4
ILL. L. REV. 533, 541 (1910).
26 (a)
Gardner v. Michigan Central R. R., 150 U. S. 349, 358 (1893): Here there
was no departure from the state law since it appeared that new evidence not before
the state court was introduced when the case was removed to the federal court.
(b) Keene Five Cent Savings Bank v. Reid, 123 Fed. 221 (C. C. A. 8th 1903): This
case was cited by Justice Brandeis as authority to the effect that the extension of
"general law" was such as to include "obligations under contracts entered into and to
be performed within the State" within the scope of the Tyson case. The question in the
case was as to when the statute of limitations began to run against the mortgagee
after several defaults by the mortgagor had been impliedly waived by the mortgagee.
The Kansas and federal view on the point conflicted in respects not here material. The
parties had stipulated in the contract that "this note and the coupons attached thereto,
shall be governed by the law of Kansas." However the issue in the federal court concerned the right to foreclose on the security given for the note, and on this point the
agreement was silent. Justice Brandeis's quarrel with the case is not clear. His point
23
24
25
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arose on other than diversity jurisdiction;
court followed the state

7

and in two cases the

2s

law.

2) Four cases were so incompletely reported and the points at
issue so narrow that their merits could not be properly evaluated. 9
3) We consider thirty-one cases were properly decided.3 0
that the "general law" was stretched to unreasonable lengths to cover "contracts
entered into and to be performed with the State" means nothing at all, unless it means
that the parties stipulated that Kansas law should apply to the question of foreclosure
of the mortgage. That this is an untenable position can be readily perceived from the
specific words of the contract itself.
(c) Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 (U. S. 1845): During the course of the Erie v. Tompkins opinion, the Court cited the Lane case as support for the contention that "State
decisions construing . . . devises of real estate were disregarded." A reading of the Lane
case reveals that this is not so. The Court expressly reviewed the state court decision
but held that it differed and could be distinguished upon several valid grounds. "The
parties in that case were not the same as those now before the court and that decision
does not affect the interests of the complainants here. The question before the Mississippi
court was whether certain ground, within the town plat, had been dedicated to the public
use. The construction of the will was incidental to the main object of the suit and of
course was not binding on anyone claiming under the will." Lane v. Vick, 3 How.
464, 476 (U. S. 1845). If the prior construction of the will would not have bound the
litigants had they been before a Mississippi court, it cannot logically be said that the
previous decision was "disregarded." It follows that the Supreme Court was right
when it did not consider itself so bound.
(d) Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353 (U. S. 1846): This is another case in which the
state decision was said to have been "disregarded." However the Supreme Court
in the Foxcroft case expressly stated that the "construction of the mortgage to the
college in respect to this reservation or condition never appears to have been litigated."
27 (a) Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397 (1888): This case came
to the court based upon admiralty jurisdiction.
(b) Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 (1903): Here the jurisdiction of the
federal court was based upon a "federal question," rather than diversity of citizenship.
28 (a) Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927): There is absolutely no
evidence that Justice Holmes failed to follow the Ohio rule in the Goodman case. Counsel
for defendant cited two Ohio cases in support of the decision finally handed down by
Holmes. It is significant that counsel for plaintiff never raised the issue of the Tyson
rule. Immediately after the Goodman decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio cited it with
approval as conforming with the existing Ohio view. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rusynik, 117
Ohio St. 530, 538, 159 N. E. 826, 828 (1927); Toledo Term. R. R. v. Hughes, 115 Ohio
St. 562, 154 N. E. 916 (1926); Detroit T. & I. R.R. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St. 493, 151 N. E.
714 (1926).
(b) Knox & Lewis v. Alwood, 228 Fed. 753 (S. D. Ga. 1915): Justice Brandeis
cited this case as an example of federal "disregard" of state law. However the
federal court actually followed the law of Georgia to the last detail. Hilton & Dodge
Lumber Co. v. Alwood, 141 Ga. 653, 658, 81 S. E. 1119, 1121 (1914).
29 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893); Green v. Keithley, 86
F. 2d 238 (C. C. A. 8th 1936); Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Miller, 174 Fed. 607 (C. C. A.
4th 1909): These three cases concerned the policy of exemplary damages. Harrison v.
Foley, 206 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th 1913): This case dealt with the admissability of certain
testimony concerning a gift causa mortis.
30 Chronological list of the thirty-one cases analyzed: (a) Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How.
134 (U. S. 1847); (b) Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495 (U. S. 1850); (c) Watson v.
Tarpley, 18 How. 517 (U. S. 1855); (d) Chicago City v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418 (U. S.
1862); (e) Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863); (f) Gelpcke v. City
of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863); (g) Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 (U. S.
1866); (h) Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869); (i) Yates v. Milwaukee,
10 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1870); (j) Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873);
(k) Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546 (U. S. 1873); (1) Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 213
(1879); (m) Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239 (1879); (n) Railroad Co. v. National
Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880); (o) Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882); (p) Myrick v.
Michigan Central R.R., 107 U. S. 109 (1882).; (q) Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 (1882);
(r) Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439 (1885); (s) Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680 (1886); (t)
Barber v. Pittsburgh R. R., 166 U. S. 83 (1896); (u) Praesido County v. Noel-Young
Bond Co., 212 U. S. 58 (1908); (v) Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (1909);
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In only six do the holdings seem erroneous."

Although it would be impracticable to review all forty-eight cases in
this paper, it seems desirable to discuss several of the cases we classify
as "properly decided."
The Municipal Bond cases8 2 represent an important class of decisions
unjustly attacked by Justice Brandeis.
About the middle of the last century the legislatures of several midwestern states, desiringto encourage the development of the railroads
within their jurisdictions passed statutes enabling municipalities to subscribe to railroad stock with the funds received from the sale of municipal bonds. The bond sales were not successful until the state supreme
courts ruled that the laws empowering the issuance of these bonds were
constitutional. Relying upon these rulings, investors felt more secure
and began to purchase the bonds. Finally the day of reckoning arrived;
but when the eastern bona fide holder sued the municipality for payment, the state supreme courts reversed their earlier holdings on the
most technical grounds imaginable,38 held the bonds invalid, and repudiated the debt. Those creditors who could do so turned to the
federal courts for relief. In every case, the Supreme Court recognized
the obligation in vigorous language.34 The justice of these decisions cannot be sincerely questioned. 5
(w) Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1923); (x) Pokora
v. Wabash R.R. 292 U..S. 98 (1933); (y) Boseman v. Insurance Co., 301 U. S. 196 (1936);
(aa) Yates v. Illinois Central R.R., 137 Fed. 943 (N. D. Ill. 1905); (bb) Curtis v.

Cleveland C. C. & St. Louis R.R., 140 Fed. 777 (E. D. Ill. 1905); (cc) Johnson v. Charles
D. Norton Co., 159 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 6th 1908); (dd) Interstate Realty & Investment
Co. v. Bibb County, Ga., 293 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 5th 1923); (ee) Midland Valley R.R.
v. Jarvis, 29 F. 2d 539 (C. C. A. 8th 1928); (if) Cole v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F. 2d
953 (C. C. A. 2d 1930).
31Black & White Taxi & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi & Transfer Co., 276
U. S. 518 (1927); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927); Beutler v.
Grand Trunk Junction R.R., 224 U. S. 85 (1911); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Baugh, 149
U. S. 368 (1892); Fowler v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 2d 1916); Eells
v. 32St. Louis K. & N. W. R.R., 52 Fed. 903 (S. D. Iowa 1892).
Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680 (1886); Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 (1882);
Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 (U. S. 1866); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175
(U. S. 1863); Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863).
33 Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680 (1880) (where the bonds were held unenforceable
because issued by a "town" instead of a "township" or "village"); Pana v. Bowler,
107 U. S. 529 (1882) (where the bonds were held void because the authorization election
was presided over by a "moderator" instead of a "supervisor," "assessor," or "collector") ;
Supervisor v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 (U. S. 1866) (where the bonds were declared invalid
because the authorization election was ordered by a "county court" instead of a "Board
of Supervisors").
34 "To this rule, thus enlarged we adhere. It is the law of this court. It rests upon
the plainest principle of justice. . . . We shall never immolate trust, justice and the law
because a state tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 206-07 (U. S. 1863).
35 See app. 8 infra. It should be noted that these decisions had a tremendous nationwide effect on municipal bond issues by convincing investors that the integrity of the
issue would be preserved. Long, A Warning Signal for Municipal Bondholders: Some
Implications of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 37 Mvcnr. L. REV. 589 (1939).
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In Hough v. The Railroad,6 an employee of the defendant had been
killed when the train upon which he was an engineer hit an obstruction
on the track and was derailed. He had warned his superior of defects
in the equipment and had been assured that repairs would be made
forthwith. At that time, the Texas courts held very rigidly to the
"fellow-servant" doctrine and also held that an employee's use of equipment, known to be defective, was contributory negligence, as a matter
of law. The Supreme Court refused to follow the Texas rules. On the
fellow-servant issue, the Court thought that there was a "well-defined"
exception to the rule where the employer exposed his employees to unreasonable hazards. On that ground, the fellow-servant doctrine was
inapplicable. Turning to the question of contributory negligence, the
Court ruled that the use of apparatus known to be defective was a
question of fact for the jury and not a question of law in every case.
On that basis, the Court used the Tyson doctrine to mitigate a very
37
arbitrary and unjust state rule.
In Midland Valley R. R. v. Jarvis,8 the railroad held a right of way
deed over property in Kansas. Defendants were lessees of the mineral
rights in these lands by a lease from the heirs of the railroad's grantor.
The railroad sought to enjoin the defendants from drilling or constructing pumps, oil wells, or power plants in such a way as to interfere
with the operation of the railroad. The Kansas courts had handed
down inconsistent opinions as to whether a railroad right of way
amounted virtually to a fee.3 However the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, expressly assuming that the law of Kansas would not
permit an injunction, granted that remedy. The court reviewed at
length the great burdens placed upon railroads by the "general" law and
felt that the high standards of performance imposed should not be
hampered by interference through the use of the right of way by owners
of the servient estate, even though such use might be justified under the
principles announced in local decisions. Not only is this decision in
line with the overwhelming weight of authority,"0 but it also meets the
highest standards of justice, expediency, and good sense.41
Perhaps the most interesting decision cited by Brandeis as indicative
36 Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 213 (1879).
87 The doctrine of the Hough case was subsequently accepted in Texas.
15 infra.

See app.

88 Midland Valley R.R. v. Jarvis, 29 F. 2d 539 (C. C. A. 8th 1928).
39 The Kansas cases are collected in Midland Valley R.R. v. Sutter, 28 F. 2d 163, 164-66

(C. C. A. 8th 1928).
40 Id. at 165.
41 A converse holding in this type of case would have magnified present day problems
in this field far beyond the serious proportions they independently attained. Rostow,
The Price of Federalism, Fortune Magazine, Dec. 1948, p. 165.
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of the injustice of Swift v. Tyson was Cole v. Pennsylvania R. R.42 A
passing train, at Watkins Glen, N. Y., ignited dry grass on the railroad's right of way, and the fire spread over abutting land to the lands
of another and finally to the plaintiff's premises. Under the "New York
fire rule" the railroad was not liable to an owner of land not abutting
upon its premises for damages caused by fire even though the railroad
had negligently caused the injury. The "general" law imposed liability
for any forseeable consequences that naturally flowed from the negligent
act even though the fire crossed the lands of numerous intervening
owners before causing damage to the plaintiff.
Judge Augustus Hand, admitting that "both logic and the overwhelming weight of authority"4 supported his action, applied the general
rule. It seems strange that the Judge took this particular opportunity
to fire a wholly gratuitous volley4 4 at the very rule which permitted him
to ignore a most unjust and thoroughly condemned principle of law.
These decisions speak for themselves.
There would seem to be little purpose in discussing the six cases
cited in the Tompkins opinion which we concede are "wrong" except
to mention that in every one of these cases, the erroneous decision was
not necessarily a result of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine. The way was
always open for the federal court to modify the "general" law to fit
the particular facts presented where it appeared that the established
"federal" rule would require an unfair result.
The Black and White Taxicab case 46 is the decision most frequently

cited as indicative of the intrinsic injustice of the Tyson doctrine. As
a matter of fact, most writers condemn the doctrine in general terms and
then point to this one decision. In reality, the case merely illustrates
a situation where the "federal" rule should have been modified.
In the Taxicab case, the plaintiff corporation had originally incorporated in Kentucky. It had negotiated a contract with a railroad for the
exclusive privilege of soliciting patronage at a railroad station. A contract of this type had long been considered by the Kentucky courts as
contrary to the state's public policy. A dispute arose when the railroad
attempted to grant a similar franchise to another taxicab company. Preferring to have the controversy decided under "general" law, plaintiff
42 43 F. 2d 953

(C.

C. A. 2d 1930).

43 Id. at 955.
44 Id. at 956-57.
45 Beale, Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 642

(1920);

Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 211, 367-68 (1924); Smith, Legal Cause

in Actions of Tort, 25 H.Av. L. REv. 103, 118 (1911); 51 C. J. 1167 (1930). But see Note,
71 A.L.R. 1102 (1931).
46 Black & White Taxi & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi & Transfer Co., 276
U. S. 518 (1928).
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transferred its rights to a Tennessee corporation in order to create the
requisite diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court applied the established "federal" rule and the plaintiff received judgment. The decision seems erroneous because there was ample evidence that the transfer to the Tennessee corporation was illusory. The transaction's only
purpose was to create a set of facts to meet federal jurisdictional requirements. However, Swift v. Tyson did not command such a decision.
In fact, the very flexibility of that doctrine permitted the Supreme
Court to examine the substance of the transaction and to modify the
federal rule so that under these particular facts Kentucky law could
have been followed. The decision is erroneous only because of the
Court's failure to do this.
The investigation of those cases cited in Erie v. Tompkins which
were decided under the ground-rule of Swift v. Tyson require several
conclusions. First, in a large majority of the cases, the court reached
a fair and equitable result. Second, that in those cases where the result
was unfair, the result did not stem from the Swift v. Tyson doctrine
but from an erroneous application of that doctrine.
The second premise of Brandeis that Swift v. Tyson did not achieve
national uniformity is equally vulnerable.
One of the basic policy considerations which law and lawyers have
faced since the inception of the federal system has been the need for
uniformity of law throughout the several states. Ellsworth himself4 7
and later Webster 4" pleaded for what might be called "perfect" unification. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that uniformity was the
object of the diversity of citizenship clause, 49 and one at least to assert
that uniform law was the great object of the Constitution itself."0 In
modern times the need for uniformity is even more urgent.51 The increase in the number of uniform statutes and the scholarly endeavors
to restate the law are recognitions of the necessity for the very maximum of uniformity in our laws.
It can hardly be seriously contended that the federal courts, operating under Swift v. Tyson, did not exert a powerful influence upon the
initiation and singular success of uniform statutory laws.5 2 However,
47 ,,... perfect uniformity must be observed thro' the whole union or jealousy and
unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity one judiciary must pervade the
whole." FoRD, ESSAYS oN TE CONSTITUTION 159 (1892).
48 "We can have no Union, no respectability, no national character, and what is more
no national justice till the States resign to one supreme head the exclusive power of
legislating, judging and executing, in all matters of a general nature." FoRD, PaMPIETrs
oN THE CoNsTTUTroN 46 (1888).
49 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch. 61,
50 Crosskey, Address, 19 ILL. VOTERS BuLLETIN, No.

83 (1809) (argument of counsel).
4 (1939).

51 See note 41 supra.
52

See Commissioners' note to § 52 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, where
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the one question that has never properly been answered is to what ex-

tent Swift v. Tyson operated to achieve uniformity of decisional state
law.
There has been really but .one attempt at such an evaluation." Professor Frankfurter concluded that "Swift v. Tyson did not promote
uniformity. . . . Evidence is wanting that state courts yield their own
law."5 4 This bold categorical negative is buttressed by evidence, fragmentary and misleading." We are led to an entirely different conclusion.
Considerations of space and simplicity precluded an analysis of all
the cases cited in the Erie opinion. For convenience, twenty cases were
chosen as the subject matter of the inquiry. The attempt was to determine the effect of Swift v. Tyson ultimately upon the law of the state
whose rule the federal court refused to follow. An analysis of these cases
is included in an appendix to this article. The results convinced us that
the rule did promote uniformity to a substantial degree-not that its
effect was immediate but that it exerted a subtle, albeit inexorable, pressure upon the state court to march in harmony with its fellows! 6
Of the cases examined, the Tyson doctrine established a substantial
degree of uniformity in thirteen. The rule was expressly rejected in
seven cases, and in four of the latter cases, the state rule still in existence is unique, outmoded, and contrary to the great weight of American authority."r
the general principle of uniformity in the interpretation of the act is expressly credited
to Swift v. Tyson 4 UzssoRm LAWS ANN. 77 (1922).
See CRAWFoRD, NcOTIABLE
INSTRUMUNTS LAW ANN. 30 (1st ed. 1897). The express declaration in many of the
uniform acts that the statute be interpreted uniformly operates to direct the federal
courts to apply the Tyson doctrine.

UN-wORm FiDucirAas AT § 13; UNIFORM PARTNER-

smp ACT § 4; UNisoaas SALES ACT § 74; UNiroEm WMAEHousE REc pTs ACT § 57. For
a general discussion of this problem, see Beutel, Common Law Judicial Technique and
the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 9 TULANE L. Rav. 64 (1934).
53 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L. Q. 499 (1928).
-4 Id. at 529.
55 A group of random cases were selected for eximination. To support his proposition,
Professor Frankfurter demonstrated that in these cases the state court promptly rejected the federal rule at the first available opportunity. The ultimate effect of the
federal rule was disregarded. The determination of the issue on such a narrow ground
was premature. See app. 1, 9, 16, 17 infra. Justice Brandeis' conclusion that Swift v.
Tyson did not promote natioral uniformity was largely based upon Professor Frankfurter's research. Brie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74 (1938).
56 See the discussion of Gelpcke v. Dubuque in the appendix for an excellent example.
The appendix also illustrates that in some cases, while the federal rule has not been
completely adopted, the case law of the state has developed to the point where the
requiem for the older state view awaits but a proper forum and set of facts.
57 See the text discussion of Cole v. Pennsylvania R.R. and the appendix discussion
of Railroad Co. v. Lockwood. Indeed, one need go no further than the Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins opinion itself to illustrate the point. The Pennsylvania substantive rule
was conceded by counsel to be a lonely minority view. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90
F. 2d 603, 604 (C. C. A. 2d 1937); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 334 (1934).
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results are not surprising. It was to be expected that a mastate courts would respond to the prestige and wisdom of the
Court. Union Savings Ass'n v. Seligman"8 illustrates this
view. In that case, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:

"It is with reluctance that I agree to overrule any case decided
by this court, and this reluctance is the greater where a line of decisions is to be overthrown .... The Supreme Court of the United
States, every member of the bench concurring, has, since Griswold
v. Seligman . . .was decided by this court, announced doctrines

in conflict with our rulings in that case.., and while we are under
no obligations to yield our own and adopt the opinions either of the
Supreme Court of the United States, or of the appellate courts of
sister states, it is our duty to receive light on doubtful questions,
from whatever source it may come. It does not become us to shut
our eyes to what other respectable courts have held, and blindly
follow what we have decided because we have decided it.""0
Likewise, it was to be expected that some state courts would be quick
to resent the intrusion upon their sacred judicial power, that they would
take the first available opportunity to vent their ire on the Tyson rationale by categorically refusing to follow the federal rule. In most cases,
the rejection was emotional rather than rational. This attitude is illustrated in McClure v. Owen6" when the Supreme Court's decision of
Gelpcke v. Dubuque was first considered by the Iowa Supreme Court.
It declared:
"It will be observed, that, while it is quite true [that] several
decisions of this court . . .are overruled by the series of adjudi-

cations declaring the county and city railroad bonds void, the Supreme Court . . . [has] disregarded principles at the very founda-

tion of the federal judicial power, without the restraining influence
of which, the country will be launched upon the stormy sea of
judicial conflict between State and federal courts, or will avoid
this by succumbing to the decrees of one great federal arbiter of
judicial questions.
* * **While such decisions may, in some cases, attain the ends
of justice, the probability is, they will work quite a different result,
and by disturbing precedents, will have the general effect of under61
mining the very fabric of our system of jurisprudence ....

,,

Despite this initial condemnation of the Supreme Court's decision, the
62
Iowa court eventually accepted the holding of that case.
58
59
60
61

92 Mo. 635, 15 S. W. 630 (1887).
Id. at 643-44, 15 S. W. at 632.
26 Iowa 243 (1868).
Id. at 258.
62 See app. 9 infra.
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Thus, if one passes beyond the initial petulant refusal to follow the
federal view and traces the cases down through the years, a consistent
pattern of piecemeal absorption can be perceived until in many instances the older state rule has been replaced by the federal rule.
Admittedly, the federal rule was n6t accepted in every instance. But
which was the better choice? The Erie v. Tompkins doctrine by requiring absolute conformity offered uniformity within one state. But
approaching the problem from a national view, the Erie doctrine
emphasized the weakness of the federal system by encouraging different
rules of law in the various states. On the other hand, the Swift v. Tyson
doctrine, while sometimes resulting in different rules of law within one
state, offered the hope of eventual national uniformity. Again-which
was the better choice?
This question cannot be answered with certainty unless we consider
the complications which have arisen from the application of the Erie
v. Tompkins doctrine.
II

The ramifications of the Erie doctrine have been so widespread that
it would be a mountainous task to attempt to uncover and present all
its difficulties. For the sake of convenience, an attempt has been made
to departmentalize those problems considered most indicative of its
impracticality.
Substance and Procedure
The asserted limitation of the Erie rule at the time of its adoption
was its pertinence to substantive questions. Nowhere was there any
doubt of federal supremacy in the promulgation of its own rules of
procedure. Only when the federal courts were confronted with a problem of law fairly defined as substantive would they be required to
abide by state decisional or statutory law. The conformity crusade extended no further than this.
Though plausible enough in its naked exposition, the substantiveprocedural demarcation actually mounted the federal courts on the
dilemma's horns. Since the nub of the policy underlying Erie v. Tompkins was that the accident of diversity of citizenship should not lead to
a substantially different result by a state and federal court within the
same geographical area, the rationale of the rule would seem equally
applicable to questions which though procedural in name, if observed,
would produce a different result.
For example, Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that in order to maintain a minority stockholder's action, the
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plaintiff must have owned stock in the corporation at the time the wrong
occurred. 3 On the other hand, some states do not so require. In these
states, if a non-resident plaintiff, who had acquired ownership subsequent to the commission of the wrong, brought his action in the local
state court, he might win; but if the action were commenced in a federal
district court within that state, he would definitely lose. 4 This must
follow because the rule at issue has been defined by the Supreme Court
as procedural, and the Erie doctrine is therefore inapplicable. It is
obvious, however, that such a result would be offensive to the spirit
of Erie because divergent results would be reached by state and federal
courts within the same geographical area.
When faced with this dilemma, some federal courts defined the issue
as substantive. 5 Conformity was thereby preserved. In branding such
issues as substantive, however, inferior' federal tribunals in effect adjudicated that the Supreme Court, in recommending Rule 23(b), exceeded the power granted to it because the congressional mandate to the
Court was that it adopt federal rules which would "neither abridge,
'
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."66
For this
reason, Brandeis' failure to join with the Supreme Court in its recommendation of the rules has the merit of consistency. Furthermore, if
as Brandeis suggested, "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State . . . ,,,1 then congressional
adoption of these rules is unconstitutional. At any rate, burden of
proof,6" contributory negligence,6 9 presumptions,70 and state statutes
63 "In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more
shareholders in an association, . . . the complaint . . . shall aver (1)

that the plaintiff

was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share
thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. . . " FED. R. Civ. P., 23(b).

64 H F G Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F. 2d 536 (C. C. A. 7th 1947); Perrott v.
United States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953, 956 (D. Del. 1944); Holtzoff, The Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc'r
57, 59 (1940); Ilsen, Recent Cases And New Developments in Federal Practice and Procedure, 16 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 28 et seq. (1941); Note, 41 CoL. L. REv. 104 (1941).
65 See Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334, 340 (D. Del.
1941), modified, 130 F. 2d 1016 (C. C. A. 3d 1942); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986,
992 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 48 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (E. D. Pa.
1943), rev'd on other grounds, 146 F. 2d 889 (C. C. A. 3d 1944); Tunks, Categorizationand
Federalism, 34 ILL. L. Rav. 271, 287 (1939); Notes, 38 CoL. L. REV. 1472, 1483-84 (1938),
41 CoL. L. REv. 989 (1941).
66 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 723(b) (1934), as amended, 62 STAT. A 124, 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072 (1948).
67 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938).
68 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939); Clark, Procedural Aspects of
the New State Independence, 8 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 1230 (1940).
69 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U. S. 208 (1939); cf. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. IUl. 1938).
70 Montgomery v. Hutchins, 118 F. 2d 661 (C. C. A. 9th 1941); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Garner, 106 F. 2d 375 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 621 (1939); 9
U. o Cm. L. REV. 113, 123 (1941); 25 IowA L. REV. 375 (1940); 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv.
466 (1940).
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of limitation,71 right to trial by jury,72 impleading of third party de-

fendants,7 ' res judicata, 74 and forum non conveniens75 have all been held
matters of substantive import to which federal courts are bound to
apply the state rules. It has even been suggested that federal courts
must follow state decisions in such rules as the direction of verdict,
taking a case from the jury, and the right of comment on the evidence.7 6
Other courts, however, when confronted with this problem, elected
to follow the more desirable federal rule even though the outcome of the
litigation differed from that reached in the state courts. Rather than
examine the efficacy of the rule whose spirit they were offending these
courts paid lip service to it by defining the rule as procedural. As a
result of these decisions, there arose a body of federal opinions no less
inconsistent with related state decisions than those so thoroughly condemned by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie v. Tompkins.7 1 It became apparent that only by a drastic revamping of the orthodox substantiveprocedural dichotomy could the Court effectuate the policy to which
it had been committed.
Backed to the wall in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 75 the Court,
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that a "policy so important
to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or
terminological niceties. 79 Mr. Justice Frankfurter discarded the existing
method of making the substantive-procedural classification and adopted
a new test. He accepted the true rationale of the Erie v. Tompkins decision by inquiring whether the issue would "significantly affect the result" of the litigation."' Apparently, if the suit would be "significantly
71 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. 2d 136
(C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 825 (1947); cf. Pepper v. Truitt, 158 F. 2d
246 (C. C. A. 10th 1946). These cases, however, do not answer the question whether
state or federal rules are to be followed in determining the effective method of commencing an action so that the statute will be tolled. On this point see text at p. 509-10.
72 Ross v. Service Lines, 31 F. Supp. 871 (E. D. Ill. 1940); Beagle v. Northern Pacific
R.R., 32 F. Supp. 17 (W. D. Wash. 1940). Contra: Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum
Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore. 1939).
73 See Thompson v. Cranston, 2 F. R. D. 270 (W. D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 132 F. 2d 631
(C. C. A. 2d 1942); cf. Keeffe and Cotter, Service of Process in Suits Against Directors,
27 CoRNELL L. Q. 74, 83 (1941).
74 Angel v. Bulington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947); Note, 33 VA. L. REV. 357 (1947).
7-5 Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947); Gulf Oil Co.
v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947).
76 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YArn L. J. 267, 289 (1946).
77 Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F. 2d 62 (C. C. A. 3d 1943); Diederich
v. American News Co., 128 F. 2d 144 (C. C. A. 10th 1942); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120
F. 2d 90 (C. C. A. 3d 1941); Krisor v. Watts, 61 F. Supp. 845 (E. D. Wis. 1945); Perrott
v. United States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944); MacDonald v. Central
Vermont R. R., 31 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1940); Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F.
Supp. 67 (D. N. J. 1939); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
78 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
79 Id. at 110.
80 Id. at 109.
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affected" by the application of the federal rule, that rule is substantive
in nature and must be disregarded. Thus, the Court retained the original
substantive-procedural classification which had been handed down in Erie
v. Tompkins but overruled that decision to the extent that the method
of making the classification was radically altered. Only by that course
could the Court assure that the accident of diversity of citizenship
would not substantially affect the result of the litigation. All that remained was to determine what issues were "significantly affected" by
federal practice.
That the determination of this question is not as easy as one would
expect is illustrated by three cases presently pending in the Supreme
Court.
In Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith,81 a minority stockholder brought an action in the District Court of New Jersey. A New
Jersey statute provided that if a minority stockholder did not own 5%
of the outstanding shares of stock or if the value of his stock did not
exceed $50,000, the corporation could require the plaintiff to post
security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees., 2 The plaintiff contended that the New Jersey statute was inapplicable in the federal court since it was procedural. The district court agreed but the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It pointed out that the New
Jersey statute announced the "public policy"8 " of that state. It was
the purpose of the statute to restrict the institution of irresponsible
derivative acions, which experience had shown were often brought
solely for the benefit of the minority stockholder and his attorney.
Under the rationale of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the statute was
clearly applicable in the federal court. On February 28, 1949, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The second case presently pending in the Supreme Court is Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co. 4 Ragan instituted an action
in the Federal District Court for Kansas for damages arising from an
automobile collision. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, he "commenced" his civil action by "filing a complaint with
the Court." 5 Pursuant to Rule 4, a Deputy United States Marshal
served a summons upon the defendant. However, between the filing of
81 170 F. 2d 44 (C. C. A. 3d 1948), cert. granted, 17 U. S. L. WEEK 3259 (U. S. March 1,
1949).
82 N. J. STAT. ANN § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1948).
83 Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F. 2d 44, 50 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
84 170 F. 2d 987 (C. C. A. 10th 1948), cert. granted, 17 U. S. L. WEEK 3259 (U. S.
March 1, 1949).
85 "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ.
P., 3.
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the complaint and the service of the summons, the Kansas statute
of limitations expired. Under the law of Kansas, the statute of limis6
tations continued to run until the actual service of the summons.
There was no doubt that if the case had been pending in the Kansas
state court, the cause of action would have been barred.T Despite this
the District Court for Kansas took jurisdiction. Laying aside the presumptive state result, it reasoned that the method of instituting an action
was essentially procedural.8" The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed. Under the test laid down in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, there was no question that the application of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "substantially affected" the result of this
particular suit. On February 28, 1949, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Ragan case.
The third case pending in the Supreme Court is Interstate Realty Co.
v. Woods."9 In order to comprehend the full impact of this litigation
on the Erie doctrine, it is necessary to review briefly two other decisions
by the Supreme Court.
In 1912 in the Lupton case,9" the Court determined the applicability
of § 15 of the New York General Corporation Law9 to the federal
courts. Section 15 provided:
"No foreign stock corporation doing business in this state shall
maintain any action in this state upon any contract made by it in
this state unless prior to the making of such contract it shall have
procured ...

[a] certificate."

The Supreme Court ruled that the New York statute could not constitutionally operate to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The State could not prescribe the
qualifications of suitors in the courts of the United States, and could
not deprive of their privileges those who were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States to resort to the Federal courts
for the enforcement of a valid contract. 0 2
86 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 60-308
87 "I concede-freely concede that

(1935).

if this case was pending in the State Court, if it
had been commenced in the State Court and pending in the State Court then the cause
of action would have been barred. . . ." Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse
Co., 170 F. 2d 987, 992 (C. C. A. 10th 1948).
88 On similar facts, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
reached the same result. Krisor v. Watts, 61 F. Supp. 845 (E. D. Wis. 1945). See
Isaaks v. Jeffers, 144 F. 2d 26 (C. C. A. 10th 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 781 (1944);
cf. Yudin v. Carroll, 57 F. Supp. 793 (W. D. Ark. 1944); Schram v. Homes, 4
F. R. D. 119 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
89 168 F. 2d 701 (C. C. A. 5th 1948), rehearing granted, 170 F. 2d 694 (1948), cert.
granted, 17 U. S. L. WEEx 3238 (U. S. Feb. 2, 1949).
90 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489 (1912).
9' N. Y. GEN. Copp. LAW § 15 (1904), as amended, N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 218 (1943).
92 David Lupton's Sons Co. v.'Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489, 500 (1912).
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The second case which must be considered with relation to the Interstate case is Angel v. Bullington.3 It involved a North Carolina statute substantially similar to the New York statute in the Lupton case,
except that it prohibited a suit for the recovery of a deficiency judgment. 4 The plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, had foreclosed a purchasemoney mortgage on property in Virginia. The mortgagor, a resident
of North Carolina, was not subject to personal service in Virginia, so
the plaintiff instituted his action to recover the remainder of the debt
in a North Carolina Superior Court. On appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court closed its doors to the plaintiff, ruling that the stafute
was jurisdictional." Without appealing from that holding, the plaintiff commenced a new action in the Federal District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina. The district court ruled that since
the North Carolina statute had been construed by its own courts as
procedural, under Erie v. Tompkins, the federal courts could take
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Bullington decision is ambiguous. Mr. Justice Frankfurter apparently rests the holding primarily upon the basis that the North Carolina state decision was res judicata, that the plaintiff's remedy was to
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the North Carolina Supreme Court holding. If the decision had been restricted to this
narrow point, the status of the Lupton decision would have been unchanged. However there is language in the opinion that raises the applicability of the Erie doctrine. In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter states:
"Cases like Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club

.

.

.

are

obsolete insofar as they are based on a view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins....
That decision drastically limited the power of federal district courts
to entertain suits in diversity cases that could not be brought in the
respective State courts or were barred by defenses controlling in
State courts."

(Italics added)."'

Now this is an amazing statement. No authority was cited to support it.
The language can only be interpreted as deliberate dicta to the effect
that if the Lupton case had arisen under the Erie doctrine, the Court
would reach an opposite result. Even though the res judicata issue had
not been available in the Bullington case, the result would have been
the same. This obviously followed from the test laid down in Guaranty
93 330 U. S. 183

(1947); Note, 33 VA. L. REV. 357 (1947).

94 N. C. GEN. STAT. ANx. § 45-36 (1943).
95 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941).

96 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 192 (1947).
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Trust Co. v. York because the issue whether the federal court had
jurisdiction substantially affected the result of the litigation. Syllogistically, the argument is impeccable; but at least three of the judges
in the Supreme Court, and probably more, are not prepared to apply
the Erie doctrine until the jurisdictional issue has been determined. Mr.
Justice Reed dissented:
"In reaching the conclusion which it does, this Court decides
that if a state court does not have the power to adjudicate a cause,
neither does a federal court in that state. It also departs from controlling precedents that state enactments on jurisdiction, remedies
and procedures do not affect the jurisdiction, remedies or procedures
of federal courts. It is true that these antedate the Erie case but
that case did not change the state and federal jurisdiction. 97
Mr. Justice Rutledge realized that a constitutional issue arose from a
reversal of the principle laid down by Chief Justice Hughes in the
Lupton case. Justice Rutledge said:
"The Erie rule did not purport to change the law of federal jurisdiction in diversity cases, taking it out of the hands of Congress
and the federal courts and putting it within the states' power to
determine."98
As applied to the facts in the Lupton case, the test laid down in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York for determining the applicability of the Erie doctrine
seems unconstitutional. The Constitution grants the plenary power of
determining the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the Congress, not
to the States. Such a construction of § 34 of the Judiciary Act, based
on the Erie doctrine, operates to delegate Congressional power to the
States. Even though the delegation is indirect, it is unconstitutional. 9
The Interstate case raises the issue squarely. In a nut-shell, the case
is the Lupton situation under the Erie doctrine. The particular statute
happens to be one enacted in Mississippi,' ° instead of New York. The
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi applied the
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York test and accordingly held that it was with97 Id. at 198-99 (dissenting opinion).
98 Id. at 210 (dissenting opinion).
99 It should be noted that there is at least one method by which the Court might evade
the "constitutional" argument in the Interstate case. The Mississippi statute might be
construed as not depriving the Mississippi courts of "jurisdiction" to grant the plaintiff
recovery, but instead, as merely providing that the defendant may set up the statute
as a defense. See Newell Contracting Co. v. State Highway Commission, 195 Miss. 395,
15 So. 2d 700 (1943). The Supreme Court might then rule that even though it may be
true that a state cannot constitutionally deprive a federal court of its jurisdiction, the
Mississippi statute may be pleaded as a defense. This argument is unsatisfactory. The
same reasoning was rejected in the Lupton case. In addition, the validity of the
constitutional issue will remain unanswered.
100 Miss. CoDE ANu. §§ 5319, 5339, 5343 (1942).
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out jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, relying upon the Lupton case. It interpreted the Bullington
decision as exclusively "concerned with the application of the doctrine
of res judicata. .. 2 01 On February 1st, 1949, the Supreme Court

granted certiorari in the Interstate case.
The Supreme Court's disposition of the Beneficial Loan, Ragan, and
Interstate cases may clarify several of the more ambiguous aspects of
the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine.
A reversal of the Beneficial Loan case seems unlikely. There is no
question but that the New Jersey minority stockholder's statute, although phrased in a procedural manner, proclaims a definite policy of
the state. The New Jersey statute operates in this particular case to
"substantially affect the result" of the litigation. A Supreme Court
holding that the statute does not bind the federal courts in New Jersey
could only be interpreted as at least a partial return to the substantive
procedural distinction. The trend is definitely in the opposite direction.
However, the Court may invent some method of evading the logical,
but unfortunate, result dictated by the principle of absolute conformity.
The Ragan case presents a more difficult problem. That case, not
only involves the substantive-procedural question, but the validity and
effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. The Ragan case, unlike
the Beneficial Loan case, does not primarily present a question of state
policy. Whether the statute of limitations tolls or does not toll when a
complaint is filed with the court is not of great import. The question
goes to technical administration, rather than to state policy. Thus, the
Supreme Court is faced with a case where the issue is clearly procedural but where plaintiff's counsel admitted that if the case were
pending in the state court, the cause of action would be barred. In
addition, the application of the Erie rationale will apparently operate
in direct conflict with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If there was ever an opportunity to go Erie all the way, this is it.
The Court need not qualify its previous position. It has consistently
reiterated and expanded the conformity principle. At the same time,
the Court has never before had occasion to go quite this far.
Of the three cases, the Interstate case presents the most difficulty.
A decisive split of opinion can be expected. The Court is faced with
a real dilemma. If the Mississippi statute is held inapplicable to the
federal courts, constitutional objections will be avoided; but the test
laid down in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York would be severely inundated
and the persuasive, force of the cases decided under the York rule ma101 Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170 F. 2d 694, 695 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
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terially weakened. Moreover, the Court would expressly sanction opposite
results in different courts within the same state-the situation for which
Swift v. Tyson was so thoroughly condemned. The Court would be
forced to recognize that a federal court sitting in diversity is more than
a court of the state. A raft of cases raising the problem whether an
issue is jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional would necessarily follow.
On the other hand, a reversal of the Interstate case would have the
merit of consistency and the York test would be salvaged. But at what
price? The Court would expressly authorize state legislatures to restrict
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. As the Lupton case so clearly
indicates, § 34 of the Judiciary Act as so construed would clearly contravene the constitutional rights of non-resident litigants. The dilemma
involves more than a mere application of the Erie doctrine; it illustrates
the fundamental weakness of the doctrine itself.
These three cases are typical of the numerous decisions which have
turned upon the applicability of Erie v. Tompkins. Contrary to its
expected effect, the doctrine has operated to create uncertainty and to
promote litigation of issues which do not go to the merits of the controversy. Although it may be true that the "Federal Digest, through
the 1937 volume, lists nearly 1000 decisions involving the distinction
between questions of general and of local law," 1 2 it is equally true that
in the eleven years since the birth of Erie v. Tompkins, the Supreme
Court has devoted 40 full-length opinions in explanation and clarification of the Erie rule. Whatever may have been the validity of
Brandeis' criticism that Swift v. Tyson promoted needless litigation,
the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine is subject to even greater reproach on
the same score.
If only the substantive-procedure distinction were prerequisite to the
application of Erie, there would be sufficient difficulty. However, there
is another major problem in its administration. After it has been determined that the issue is one in which state decisional law must be
ascertained and followed, the court is immediately confronted with the
problem of how that law is to be ascertained.
Determining Applicable State Law
In the Erie case, Mr. Justice Brandeis announced that the law of
the state as declared by its "highest court '1 °3 must be applied. Did
this by implication exclude the decisions of inferior tribunals? The
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74 n. 8 (1938).
103 "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the
State shall be declared by its Legislature or its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938).
102
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Supreme Court later said no. Such an arbitrary distinction would
sanction the very condition which the Tompkins decision condemneddifferent results in state and federal courts. Since there are countless
legal issues which have not or never will be adjudicated in the highest
state courts, such a rule would improperly limit the Erie doctrine.
Despite its apparent advisability, the solution necessarily adopted by the
Court has proved equally as distasteful as the condition sought to be
remedied.
The principal objection to the rule arises from the difficulty of its
practical administration. It is agreed that the federal courts are bound
by decisions of some of the lower state tribunals, but which ones?
Numerous decision by the Supreme Court have not provided an answer.
Except insofar as the cases provide a general guide in that they pass
upon the effect of a decision by a particular court in a particular state,
the Supreme Court decisions leave the status of other state tribunals
undetermined.
A comparison of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field"°4 and King v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America" 5 illustrates the
confusion.
In the Field case, a New Jersey statute018 had been twice construed
by the Chancery Court of New Jersey.'
These decisions had not been
reviewed by New Jersey's highest court. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit found it impossible to distinguish the facts in the two
Chancery cases from those in the Field case but concluded that it was
not bound by the two decisions because they did not "truly express the
state law."' 8 The Supreme Court reversed. It pointed out that under
New Jersey law, "a uniform ruling ... by the Court of Chancery ...

over a course of years will not be set aside by the highest court 'except
for cogent and important reasons'."'
The Court stated:
"At the present time the Thatcher and Travers cases [the two
Chancery cases] stand as the only exposition of the law of the State
with respect to the construction and effect of the statutes of 1932,
and the Circuit Court of Appeals was not at liberty to reject these
decisions merely because it did not agree with their reasoning.""'
104 108 F. 2d 521 (C. C. A. 3d 1939), cert. granted, 309 U. S. 652 (1939), rev'd, 311
U. S. 169 (1940).
105 65 F. Supp. 740 (W. D. S. C. 1946), rev'd, 161 F. 2d 108 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), aff'd,
333 U. S. 153 (1948).
106 N. J. STAT. Aw-I. § 17:9-4 (1923), repealed, N. J. STAT. Awx. § 17:9A-336 (A)
(12) (Supp. 1948).
107 Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N. 3. Eq. 408, 182 Atl. 912 (1936); Travers
v. Reid, 119 N. J. Eq. 416, 182 Atl. 908 (1936).
108 108 F. 2d 521, 526 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
109 311 U. S. 169, 179 (1940).
110 Ibid.
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In the King case, the plaintiff sued on an insurance policy which
insured against accidental death but contained a clause exempting the
company from liability for "death resulting from participation . . . in
aviation." The insured lost his life when a plane in which he was flight
observer made an emergency landing in the Atlantic Ocean. He was
not seriously injured in the landing, but the plane sank and he was
dead when picked up in a life jacket four and a half hours later. The
medical diagnosis established that he had drowned "as a result of exposure in the water. . . ."I" The District Court for South Carolina,
sitting in diversity, allowed recovery under the broad principles of
South Carolina insurance law "that ambiguities in an insurance contract
are to be resolved in favor of the beneficiary, and that the cause of
death ... is the immediate, not the remote cause.""' 2 Two months later
a South Carolina court, the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg
County, also allowed Mrs. King recovery in a suit against a different
insurer on a policy which contained an almost identical aviation clause.
The King case was then appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
That court reversed the District Court in spite of the decision of the
Spartanburg county court. That decision was not controlling "since it
was not binding on other South Carolina courts and since the court
rendering it had relied on the District Court's ruling"'1 in the King
case. Due to South Carolina's general theories of proximate cause in
tort cases and considerable authority in other jurisdictions, the Circuit Court of Appeals did not believe that the decision by the Spartanburg county court was a valid expression of the law of South Carolina.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. At that time,
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County
handed down a decision which followed the view taken by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, but not on the basis
of the recent decision by the Greenville county court. It expressly
stated that the "Circuit Court of Appeals did not have to follow the
decision of the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County."" 4
The Supreme Court stressed the fact that "an unappealed decision of
a Court of Common Pleas is binding only upon the parties who are
before the Court in that particular case and would not constitute a
precedent in any other case in that Court or in any other court in the
State of South Carolina.""15 The Court stated that "it would be
incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound by a decision which
111 333 U. S. 153, 154 (1948).
112 Id. at 155.
113 Id. at 157.
114 Id. at 162.

11r Id. at 160.
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However the Court
would not be binding on any state court." 1
cautioned that the King decision was not "to be taken as promulgating
a general rule that federal courts need never abide by determinations
of state law by state trial courts."' " 7
What is the practising lawyer to conclude from the Field and King
decisions? He might surmise that federal courts, unless convinced by
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise, are bound by the lowest state tribunal unless a decision by that
tribunal would 'not constitute a precedent in another case. With this
general rule, the practising lawyer then turns to his particular case.
He wonders which of the courts in his jurisdiction hand down decisions
which "constitute a precedent in another case." Does the Municipal
Court of New York City fall within that category? How about the
County Court of Westchester County? He wonders what type of
"persuasive data" will be sufficient to establish that "the highest court
of the state would decide otherwise." If the federal court is bound
to arrive at the same result as would the highest court of the state, it
logically follows that the federal court should be permitted to use
exactly the same type of "data" as would the highest state court. If
the Erie doctrine is to apply full force, the federal court should be permitted to consider the economic and social policies of the highest state
court. Decisions in other jurisdictions would be pertinent if the highest
state court would also consider them. After determining what type
of "data" the federal court will consider, the practising lawyer then
wonders how "persuasive" that "data" must be. Must the "data" be
more "persuasive" than the highest court of the state would require?
Logically, no. Or, on the other hand, is this problem one of practical
administration, so that the principles of the Erie doctrine need not be
applied?
Perhaps the best solution for the practising lawyer is to make a
guess and then appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
The situation is more confused by the fact that the lower federal
courts have reacted against the restrictive position taken by the Supreme Court. Where there are direct holdings or compelling dicta by
the highest state courts, of course the Erie rule is generally observed;...
but in their absence, the lower courts have invented exceptions whereby
they are permitted to use independent judgment to decide on the merits.
116 Id. at 161.
117 Id. at 162.
118 Boston Casualty Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 136 F. 2d 31 (C. C. A. 1st 1943);
Rohm v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 133 F. 2d 154 (C. C. A. 6th 1943); Stinson
v. Edgemoor Iron Works, 55 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del. 1944).
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If the cases cited by the lower state court are not in point," 9 if there
is a higher court dicta to the contrary, 2 ° if in affirming the holding of
the intermediate court the state supreme court has explicitly left the
particular issue open,"' or if the intermediate court decisions are opposing, 2 the federal courts may decide independently of these rulings.
Escapes are not limited to these situations. The difference between
state and federal results may be explained on the ground that the
federal court is not bound by a state finding of fact even where the evidence in both cases is the same."
There may be some question as to
what the state decision means.. or a great deal of time may have elapsed
since the state case was decided.' 25 If neither party pleads or proves
the state law, the federal court may use its own judgment; 26 furthermore, if after judgment in a federal court, the state courts indicate a
change in state law, a rehearing will be granted.'
And if there is
no state law on the subject, some courts hold that they are not required
to speculate as to how the state court might decide but may reach a
decision which reason dictates or which sound judgment demands, with
the faith that the local courts will reach the same decision when the
question comes before them. 2 "
Thus, as a matter of actual practise, it is often impossible to determine whether a decision by a state court will or will not be binding
upon a federal court. But apart from this lamentable uncertainty,
the Erie doctrine is subject to still another criticism.
Assume a situation similar to that which existed in the Field case.
Two state intermediate courts have agreed upon the interpretation of
a state statute. A non-resident plaintiff brings a suit which is dependent
upon that interpretation. If the state decisions support his claim, he
will institute his action in the federal court, and that court will be
obligated to apply these decisions. Even the Supreme Court of the
United States would be powerless to review the interpretation. But
note that an opposite result would be reached if plaintiff brings his
119 Cooper v. American Airlines, 149 F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
120 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Meinsen, 131 F. 2d 176
(C. C. A. 8th 1942).

121 Wickes Boiler Inc. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 121 F. 2d 415 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
122 United States v. Norsam Realty Corp., 125 F. 2d 456 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). Contra:

Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F. 2d 488 (C. C. A. 8th 1941).
123 Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. 2d 979 (C. C. A. 4th 1944).

124 Arab Corp. & Duneco v. Bruce, 129 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 5th 1942).
125 Wells v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 754 (D. N.

D. 1942).

126 Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F. 2d 889 (C. C. A. 8th 1944).
127 Vandenbark v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538 (1941).
128 Dailey v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (C. C. A. 7th 1945); New England Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F. 2d 414 (C. C. A. 4th 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 629 (1941);

cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943); Franzen v. E. I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 146 F. 2d 837 (C. C. A. 3d 1944); Jackman v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of United States, 145 F. 2d 945 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
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action in the state court. No previous decision would foreclose defendant from arguing his case on the merits, receiving a determination
of its soundness and justice, or prosecuting an appeal to the highest
court in the state.
In addition, the Erie doctrine has encouraged "shopping" of a different type. As a further price of conformity, uniform federal conflicts of law rules have been sacrificed. 29
Prior to Erie v. Tompkins, the federal courts had always assumed
the power to determine which state law would be applicable in conflicts
cases. 3 ' It was one thing to declare that state decisions controlled
local situations, but it was quite another to deify them as to matters
arising entirely outside the state. Certainly, there exists no such constitutional requirement. Especially in this area, where local prejudices
would be most likely to affect rights derived in other states, federal
independence should be encouraged.1' Despite the merits of this argument, the Klaxon case1 2 expressly ruled that federal courts must follow
the conflicts of law rules of the states in which they are respectively
situated.
The manner in which this ramification of the Erie doctrine encourages
"shopping" is illustrated in Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America v. Meinsen. 33 A Missouri resident purchased an insurance
policy in Ohio from an Ohio insurance company. Under the law of
Ohio, a provision in the policy containing a short statute of limitations
was valid. However, the plaintiff instituted his action on the policy in
a federal district court in Missouri, and that court was bound by the
Missouri public policy declaring such clauses void. Of course a different
result would have been reached if that action had been commenced in
an Ohio federal court. Thus, the Erie doctrine permitted the plaintiff
to "shop" for a jurisdiction whose public policy afforded him opportu129 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941); Seaboard Surety Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 121 F. 2d
288 (C. C. A. 8th 1941); Breslin v. Nat'l Surety Co., 114 F. 2d 65 (C. C. A. 3d 1930);

754 (C. C. A. 1st 1940); New England Mut. Life Ins.
C. A. 2d 1939); Meinsen v. Order of United Commercial
D. Mo. 1942); Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.
Tex. 1941).
130 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827); Coox, TnE LoICAL AND LEGAL

Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. 2d
Co. v. Spence, 104 F. 2d 665 (C.
Travelers, 43 F. Supp. 756 (W.
v. Titus, 41 F. Supp. 171 (S. D.'

BASES OF THE CoNrLicT oF LAWS 108 (1942).

131 "That a state forum in a conflict of laws case may, subject to constitutional limitations, refuse to recognize a cause of action founded upon a foreign set of operative
facts is an accepted infirmity of the prevailing conflict of laws system. But, to perpetuate
this infirmity in the federal courts, where jurisdiction for suits between citizens of different states was created to afford an impartial tribunal free from local prejudices,
vitiates that very purpose of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." Wolkin, Conflict of Laws
in the Federal Courts: The Erie Area, 94 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 293, 298-99 (1946).
132 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
133 131 F. 2d 176 (C. C. A. 8th 1942); see Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586 (1947).
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nity to evade the express terms of the insurance policy. The doctrine
operated to forestall a different result in the "court-house around the
corner" but completely ignored the court-house just across the state
border. Admittedly, the federal system has an inherent defect in that
"shopping" will always exist to a limited extent, but the Erie doctrine
does not solve the problem. It merely substitutes a different method
of "shopping." The Court is trying to destroy a horrible reflection by
building a new mirror. It just won't work.
Thus, the rule of absolute conformity, the rule which relegates the
federal courts to a position distinctly inferior to state tribunals, has
operated to achieve the very iniquities it was intended to cure--"uncertainty" and "shopping." In addition, the Erie doctrine has had a
more subtle and unfortunate effect in another field of the law. It has
greatly changed that category of issues previously considered "federal."
The Federal Field
Although the Court has been liberal in extending the Erie doctrine
into the field of "procedure" and in expanding the class of state decisions which federal courts must follow, in related areas complete
independence of federal courts has been jealously preserved.
Except for a brief period immediately following the Erie v. Tompkins
decision, there has never been any doubt that where the jurisdiction of
the federal court arises from a "federal question" rather than "diversity
of citizenship," the "laws of the several states"'" 4 do not apply. The
federal court system is integrated where "the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States"' 3 5 so provide or imply. Thus, suits
under the Federal Reserve Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, or the
Labor Management Relations Act do not normally involve the Erie
doctrine. Neither state statutory nor state decisional law is pertinent.
Of course the federal statute may expressly or impliedly provide that
state law is applicable. For example, in the recent Spiegel case, 3 6 the
Supreme Court looked to state law to determine whether the settlor of
an inter vivos trust retained an interest in the corpus of the trust until
the moment of his death. That question determined whether the corpus
of the trust should be included in his estate for taxation purposes.
Bankruptcy presents another federal field where state law may be
indirectly pertinent. In Corn Exchange Bank and Trust Co. v.
134 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1928), as amended, 62 STAT. A 101, 28 U. S. C.

§ 1652 (1948).
'35 Ibid.

136 Spiegel's Estate v. Comm'r, 69 Sup. Ct. 337 (1949); Conway, I. R. C. § 811 (c)The Church and Spiegel Interpretation, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 376 (1949).
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Klauder,8" 7 the Supreme Court looked to state law to determine whether
there had been a preference.
Theoretically, however, the Erie doctrine is invoked only where jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity of citizenship. In this field, the
doctrine has been applied and construed liberally. There is one exception. Even though the jurisdiction of the court is based upon diversity of citizenship, the Supreme Court has shown increasing susceptibility to the argument that federally created rights are being
litigated. Under these conditions, the proceeding is analogous to an
action based on "federal question" jurisdiction-at least in so far as
the federally created right is involved. "If the case involves rights
under an obligation of the United States, if the rights involved arise
under a federal statute, or if the policy of a federal statute requires
uniformity in the field in which the particular action lies,""' the Erie
doctrine is inapplicable even though the jurisdiction of the court is
based upon diversity of citizenship. Federal common law is invoked.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court is indicative of this trend.
In Francis v. Southern Pacific Co.,'89 minor children brought an action
pursuant to the Utah "death statute"' 40 to recover damages for the
death of their father. The suit was instituted in a federal court in
Utah, jurisdiction being based upon diversity of citizenship. The complaint alleged that the father, a railroad employee, had been killed in
Utah while riding the railroad as an interstate passenger. The father
had traveled on a free pass, not in connection with his duties as an
employee. The pass provided that the user assumed all risk of injury
and absolved the railroad from any liability. According to the law
of Utah, the waiver was invalid; but according to federal law, the waiver
was effective insofar as it exempted the liability of the railroad for
"ordinary" negligence. Both Utah and federal courts agreed that the
railroad would be liable for wanton negligence. That question never
arose because the federal court charged the jury according to the federal rule. The jury found for the railroad. On appeal, the issue was
whether the state or federal rule was applicable. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. To support its position that
the federal rule was applicable, the Court referred to the Hepburn Act
and cases interpreting it. In 1906, the Hepburn Act'4 ' imposed a
criminal liability on railroads issuing free passes to anyone except its
137 318 U. S. 434 (1942).

138 Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law,
59 HTAv. L. Rxv. 966, 976 (1946).
139 162 F. 2d 813 (C. C. A. 10th 1947), aff'd, 333 U. S. 445 (1948).
140 UTAu CODE AN. § 104-3-11 (1943).
141 24 STAT. 379, 387 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 22 (1946).
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employees and their families. Although previous Supreme Court decisions had held that waivers on free passes were valid, it was not until
1923 in the Van Zant case.4 2 that the Court decided the duty of an
interstate carrier to one riding on a free pass was to be determined by
the Hepburn Act, not by state law:
"The provision for passes, with its sanction in penalties, is a
regulation of interstate commerce to the completion of which the
"13
determination of the effect of the passes is necessary ...
In 1940, Congress had passed the Transportation Act, 144 amending the

Hepburn Act but not substantially changing its provisions concerning
free passes. The Supreme Court interpreted this legislation as congressional approval of the Van Zant ruling that the entire "free pass"
problem was a question of federal law, and that a waiver on a free pass
was effective insofar as it exempted the railroad from liability for
"ordinary" negligence.
Three justices dissented. They argued that state law should govern
the effect of a waiver on a free pass. They pointed to the Utah "death
statute" as the real basis for the substantive right. 4 5 The minority
also urged that even if the question was one of federal law, the alleged
federal rule should be abandoned as inconsistent with existing social
policy.' 46 The dissenters maintained that the decisions which had
established the federal rule had been invalidated by Erie v. Tompkins.
Except for the Van Zant case, which had been primarily concerned
with the application rather than the interpretation of the Hepburn Act,
all decisions which had applied the federal rule had been decided under
Swift v. Tyson. Those cases had dealt with the "federal common law"
rather than an interpretation of the Hepburn Act. Since the "federal
common law" had been abolished by Erie v. Tompkins, a fresh opportunity existed to determine the effect of a waiver on a free pass.
But our concern is not with the merits of a particular federal rule
of law; it is with the effect of Erie v. Tompkins on the whole field of
the law. What the Erie rule has changed is the dimensions of the federal areas where the jurisdiction of the court is based upon diversity of
citizenship. Paradoxically, the decision has resulted in a widespread
expansion of the area within which federal law is controlling instead
of protecting the rights of the forty-eight states.
Another recent decision by the Supreme Court shows that the Erie
142
143
144
145
146

Kansas City So. R. R. v. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459 (1923).
Id. at 468.
54 STAT. 898, 900 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 22 (1946).
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U. S. 445, 456 (1948).
333 U. S. at 452, 471.
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doctrine may be limited where a federal statute is incidentally involved.
In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,'4 7 the plaintiff sued for
breach of price-maintenance provisions in a patent-license contract.
The defendant contended that the patents were invalid and the contract
therefore violated the Sherman Act. The plaintiff replied that, according to state law, defendant was estopped to deny the validity of the
contract. The Court rejected the state law. It stated:
". the doctrine of [the Erie case] is inapplicable to those areas
of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which
they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its
source in those statutes, rather than by local law. . . . When a
federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature
of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions,
the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the
federal policy which it has adopted. To the federal statute and
policy, conflicting state law and policy must yield."' 148
Another Supreme Court decision of the same type opens a new vista
for the application of federal common law in diversity suits. In O'Brien
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,' 49 a defamatory message was transmitted by telegraph from Massachusetts to Michigan. The Court held
that the defendant's privilege was to be determined by federal common
law because the Telegraph Company was subject to comprehensive
regulation under the Federal Communications Act.
The same reasoning should be equally applicable to other situations.
The radio industry is subject to the same degree of federal regulation
as is the telegraph industry. How can radio libel or slander be distinguished from the facts in the O'Brien case?
It is inconsistent with Erie to apply federal common law to questions
two or three times removed from the federal statute under which the
suit is brought. In a national business such as telegraph, radio or television, chaos will result if a uniform federal common law be not applied.
As an antidote to the law forbidding intermeddling with state-created
rights, the federal courts have simply confined the area within which
they are impotent, at the same time enlarging the bounds within which
they still retain independence of thought and decision. In this respect,
the very essence of the doctrine has been unconsciously repudiated.
147 317 U. S. 173 (1942).
148 Id. at 176.
149 113 F. 2d 539 (C. C. A. 1st 1940), 54 HAv. L. REv. 141; cf. Vaigneur v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E. D. Tenn. 1940), 41 CoL. L. Rav. 125 (1941); American

Surety Co. v. First Natl Bank, 141 F. 2d 411 (C. C. A. 4th 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S.
574 (1944).
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The trend is but one manifestation of a desire by a great number of
federal courts to free themselves from the binding rigidity of the Erie
decision and to return once again to the judicial function.
Conclusion
It seems reasonable to draw the following conclusions:
1. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins is now a matter of pure faith. It is
followed blindly and in disregard of the public interest.
2. On its own facts, the Erie case was unjustly decided. If the
state of Pennsylvania absolves the railroad from responsibility for such
negligence, its rule is unjust and should not be forced upon the federal
courts.
3. The validity of the Charles Warren research on § 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 should have been briefed and tested by the
fire of oral argument. The refusal of the majority to consent to this
argument was intolerant. Until the controversy is litigated, the research of Warren cannot be accepted as justification for Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.
4. Any attempt to attack Swift v. Tyson on constitutional grounds
is untenable. The argument is so devoid of merit that even the most
ardent defenders of Erie have abandoned it.
5. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson promoted justice. An analysis
of the cases cited in the Erie opinion indicates that almost every
application of the Tyson doctrine resulted in a fair decision. Contrast
this with Erie which chains the federal courts to provincial and antiquated state holdings. New York's monstrous one house fire rule is a
perfect example.
6. Granted that taxicab concessions at railroad stations should be
regulated by state not national law, a matter not free from doubt, the
Black and White Taxicab case was an instance of manufactured diversity. The very flexibility of the Tyson rule permitted the Court
to cope with that situation. The misapplication of Swift v. Tyson in
this one case justifies neither a general criticism nor an abolition of
the whole doctrine.
7. The true diversity case to which Story intended to apply Swift v.
Tyson is a litigation between citizens of different states. In giving
jurisdiction to the federal courts in such cases, it must have been the
intention of the draftsmen of our Constitution to grant federal judges
the traditional judicial powers. John J. Parker, Senior Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, points out that it is "absurd
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to hold in a suit on contract between citizens of different states that
a federal court must apply the law of the state of the party charged
with the breach because suit had to be brought against him in that
state." 510 Absurd it is, but precisely the present state of the law.
8. It was Story's far-sighted thought that in deciding controversies
between citizens of different states, the Supreme Court of the United
States would gradually achieve national uniformity in our law. Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins rests in large part upon the proposition that national
uniformity did not result from Swift v. Tyson. The evidence is available and we have examined it. From our study we submit there can
be no doubt that Swift v. Tyson lived up to Story's ideal.
9. The greatest virtue of"Sw.ift v. Tyson is its flexibility. Any syster of law must be continuously adaptable to changing social conditions. Until a state legislature adopts a rule of law by statute, there is
great merit in granting a free exercise of the judicial process. If the federal rule is unsatisfactory, the state legislature can provide a remedy. If
the corrective statute is constitutional, the federal courts will respect it.
10. Pressure is being exerted to extend Erie into the field of federal
procedure. This trend has resulted in confusion and technicality. It
also endangers the advancement which has resulted from the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of Erie, the Advisory
Council has already amended Rule 14 to make it impossible to implead
a joint tortfeasor. We can only hope that the expansion of Erie into
the field of procedure will be checked by the Supreme Court's disposition of the Beneficial Loan, Ragan, and Interstate cases.
11. The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins is also being pressed to
ridiculous limits in determining the applicable state decisional law. The
rule that the Supreme Court of the United States must follow an outdated decision by an inferior state court is ludicrous. Its very incongruity has resulted in needless litigation and proverbially bad law.
12. Not satisfied with chaining federal courts to procedural law as
expounded by a state's lowest court, there is a gallant effort being made
to extend Erie beyond diversity cases into the field of federal law. The
American Bar Association has proposed that preferences in bankruptcy
be determined by state law. If Justice Frankfurter has his way, a
trustee in bankruptcy will not be allowed to sue in any federal court
where the bankrupt could not sue. The problem is difficult because
in many cases it is impossible to distinguish state law points that arise
350 Parker, Erie v. Tompkins-In Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area and
Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19, 86 n. 14 (1949).
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incidentally in a bankruptcy, patent, or radio case from similar points
arising in a diversity case. But as Eugene Rostow has recently pointed
out, the country's business cannot be subjected to forty-eight rules of
law when so much of its business is national in scope151
13. The whole history of this controversy has glorified Story rather
than Brandeis. Story's genius lay in his ability to foresee the advisability
of a national system of law where the particular controversy was not
local in nature. He conceived of diversity jurisdiction as one method
of encouraging interstate relations by insuring for the out-of-state
litigant an unprejudiced tribunal operating under one impartial and
uniform body of law. Even in the absence of local prejudice, Story
realized that the constitutional power of the federal courts to establish
law which would operate nationally could be utilized to aid in the development of the union, particularly in the field of commerce. Brandeis,
motivated by a misconception of the practical effect of the Story concept
and influenced by a rational abhorrence of the possibility of contradictory rules within one geographical area, has plunged us into a morass
of technicality and confusion. Furthermore, his policy of absolute
conformity has made impossible the eventual fruition of the concept of
a national law, so necessary in our day when state borders become
steadily more imperceptible.
What can be done about it? The answer is clear. Reverse Erie and return to Swift v. Tyson. If the Court cannot bring itself to do this, then the
next best thing is to modify rigorously the Erie doctrine so that we
would return to the approximate status which had evolved under Swift
v. Tyson immediately prior to the Erie case. The Court had begun to
realize that the policies of uniformity and conformity must be confined
to their separate spheres.1 52 A pragmatic approach which will make
provision for the interplay of the unique conflicting interests which history has taught us are at work in diversity cases seems to be the only
exit from the legal labyrinth of Erie. More specifically, a decision is
needed which will declare definitively the areas in which conformity
151 Rostow, The Price of Federalism, Fortune Magazine, Dec. 1948, p. 165.
152 Mr. Justice Cardozo gave voice to this concept in Mutual Life Co. v. Johnson,
293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934). "Without suggesting an independent preference one way
or the other, we yield to the judges of Virginia. . . . The case will not be complicated
by a consideration of our power to pursue some other course. The summum jus of
power, whatever it may be will be subordinated at times to a benign and prudent
comity. At least in cases of uncertainty we steer away from a collision between courts
of state and nation when harmony can be attained without the sacrifice of ends of
national importance." (Italics added).
Judge Clark has subscribed to a similar view. "But may there not be a lesson in
this experience, that no violent arbitrary rule can be wholly successful in adjusting
sovereign rights in a federal system, and that perhaps a middle or at least a more gradual
way, may be more successful in the long run?" Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts:
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 278 (1945).
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must be sacrificed to uniformity and, conversely, when conformity
is to reign supreme.
Such a decision, drawing upon the experience gained from the past,
would (1) return the federal courts to their function of judging, (2)
give flexibility without an unreasonable amount of instability, (3)
balance the conflicting policies of uniformity and conformity, confining
each to its proper sphere, and (4) abolish the crazy disarray of cases
born in the wake of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.
APPENDIX
(1) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842): The subsequent acceptance by New York

of the Swift v. Tyson principle is elaborately discussed in

BRITTON,

HANDBOOK

ON THE

oF BILLs AND NoTEs 380 (1943). Professor Yntema nicely refutes Professor Frankfurter's assertion that the Tyson rule was not conducive to uniformity by tracing the
subsequent history of the case in eight jurisdictions and substantiating his position on the
battle ground chosen by Professor Frankfurter himself. Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary
Aspects of Concurrent Jurisdiction,79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869, 881 (1931).
(2) Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 (U. S. 1845): The case involved the construction of a
will and it does not appear that the precise point arose subsequently in the Mississippi
courts. Because of the unique phraseology of the will, the case has not been very active
in the state reports. However, four states have cited it with approval. Arkansas: Cox
v. Britt, 22 Ark. 567 (1861). California: Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (1860). Colorado:
Bacon v. Nichols, 47 Colo. 31, 105 Pac. 1082 (1909). Wisconsin: Maxcy v. Oskosh, 144
Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899 (1910); Ehle v. Ehle, 73 Wis. 445, 41 N. W. 627 (1889). But
see Note, 71 A. L. R. 1102, 1104 (1931). Here again the writer refuses to realize that in
this case there was no departure from state law; the precise issue had never come before
the Mississippi courts. See note 26 (c) supra.
(3) Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353 (U. S. 1846): The point at issue was the construction of a real estate deed. The language used in the deed was unusual; consequently,
the case has not been very active. On the question whether or not a judgment in
partition bars the legal title, the case was not followed in Maine. Foxcroft v. Barnes,
29 Me. 128 (1848). It does not appear that counsel relied upon the federal case in his
argument. Nor is Foxcroft v. Mallett in line with the weight of authority on the partition question. See Note, 144 A. L. R. 9, 21 (1943).
(4) Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134 (U. S. 1847): Plaintiff and defendant entered into
a contract for the sale of slaves in 1836. In 1837, the courts of Mississippi held such contracts void. The plaintiff sued in the federal courts on the promissory note given as
consideration under the contract and was permitted to recover. The Supreme Court
held that decisions of state courts invalidating contracts, which were perfectly legal
when made, could not have a retroactive effect. The rule of Rowan v. Runnels was
expressly approved and quoted by the Mississippi court. "If a contract when made was
valid under the laws of the state as then expounded and administered in its Courts of
justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any ... subsequent decision of its
Courts." Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 571, 598, 54 So. 247, 249 (1910).
(5) Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495 (U. S. 1850): This case was never followed by
the New York courts. Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245, 251, 252 (1873). The Supreme
Court subsequently reversed the Berry case. Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427 (U. S.
1860).
(6) Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517 (U. S. 1855): In a decision directly contra to
the Mississippi rule, the Court held that the holder of a dishonored bill of exchange has
the right of immediate recourse over against the drawer. Mississippi had held that such
a payee was barred from commencing his action until the date of maturity. Mississippi
is now in line with the Watson case. Miss. CODE ANN. § 192 (1942).
(7) Chicago City v. Robbins, 2 Black 418 (U. S. 1862): The question was whether
an owner was liable for the negligence of an independent contractor or his servants.
The early rule in Illinois was that such an owner was not liable provided he used due
care in selecting the contractor. Scammon v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. 424 (1861). In
the Robbins case, the Court refused to follow the Scammon case and engrafted a broad
exception on the rule-that the owner was liable when the tontractor was hired to
perform an inherently dangerous task. Accordingly, a municipality was held liable for
LAw
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damages occurring as a result of the negligence of the employees of an independent
contractor hired by the city to fix its streets. The Robbins case was cited with approval
by the Illinois court. City of Bloomington v. Bay, 42 Ill. 503, 507 (1867); City of
Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476, 479 (1869). The Illinois courts continued to cite
the Scammon and Robbins cases side by side, apparently limiting the holding of the
Robbins case to municipalities. Finally, the legislature intervened and passed a statute
which applied the Robliins view in all cases. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48 §§ 60-69 (1935). In
Griffiths and Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 fI1. 331, 335, 141 N.E. 739, 740
(1923), the court held that the Scammon case was old law and refused to follow it;
the Robbins coup in Illinois was complete. The case is also the weight of authority in
the United States. See Note, 29 A. L. R. 736 (1924).
(8) Mercer County v. Hackett, I Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863): In Diamond v. Lawrence
County, 37 Pa. 353 (1860), the highest court of Pennsylvania held that certain bonds
given to a railroad in return for stock and then negotiated by the railroad to a bona
fide purchaser were invalid. During the course of the opinion, the court made this
surprising statement: "We have said, on several former occasions, that we will not
treat bonds like these as negotiable securities. On this ground we stand alone. All the
courts American and English are against us. Be it so." The Supreme Court in the
Hackett case refused to apply this narrow Pennsylvania doctrine and held that such
bonds were negotiable-a decision in line with the great weight of Anglo-American
authority. Twenty-one years later, the choice of the two conflicting cases came before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In an opinion, unique for its sarcasm and bitterness,
the Diamond case was rejected. Kerr v. Corry, 105 Pa. 282, 292-93 (1884).
(9) Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863): The history of the treatment of this case by the Iowa courts is most interesting. Early in Iowa history, the
constitutionality of railroad subscriptions by municipalities was first affirmed in Dubuque
County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene 1 (Iowa 1853). Later the power was denied in State
v. Wapello County, 13 Ia. 388 (1862). Then came Gelpcke v. Dubuque in the Supreme
Court, where the power was upheld. In McClure v. Owen, 26 Ia. 243, 253 (1868), the
Gelpcke case was severely criticized and specifically rejected. The next case was Hanson
v. Vernon, 27 Ia. 28 (1869). Judge John F. Dillon, author of the monumental work on
municipal corporations, held that the legislature had no constitutional power to authorize municipalities to tax to aid railroad construction. Then came a sharp break in
the decisions, one that, according to Judge Dillon, "virtually overthrew the line of
decisions denying the power." 1 DiLoN, MuNiciPA' CoapoRATioNs 570 (5th ed. 1911).
Snell v. Leonard, 55 Ia. 553, 8 N. W. 425 (1881); Renwick, Shaw, & Crossett v. Davenport
& N. W. R. R., 47 Ia. 511 (1877); and Stewart v. Polk County, 30 Ia. 9 (1870), all supported the constitutionality of legislative authorization of municipal taxation to aid railroads. Judge Dillon was "constrained to admit that a long and almost unbroken line of
judicial decisions in the courts of most of the States, as well as in the Supreme Court of the
United States, has established and settled the principle that, in the absence of special
restrictive constitutional provisions, it is competent for the legislature to authorize a
municipal or public corporation to aid, in the manner above indicated, [i.e., stock subscriptions, issuance of negotiable bonds, and taxation] the construction of railways
CoRPoRATrONs 569
running near, or to, or through its territory." 1 Drr.Lo, MuzciP'.
(5th ed. 1911). Even Judge Beck, who wrote the opinion in the McClure case and
dissented in the Stewart and Renwick cases, finally concurred in the Snell case. It
seems perfectly obvious that Gelpcke v. Dubuque was surreptiously absorbed in Iowa
and consciously accepted in other jurisdictions. See Note, 14 L. R. A. 475, 479 (1891). The
Gelpcke doctrine also created "substantial uniformity" on the question of bond recital
estoppel. Long, A Warning Signal for Municipal Bondholders: Some Implications of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 37 MicH. L. RaEv. 589, 594 (1939). Another authority points
out that eighteen states, including Iowa, have followed the Dubuque case on this point.
6 McQuiLLAN, MusNcipAL CoapoRATios 245-46 (2d rev. ed. 1937). On the point of
retroactivity of judicial decision in general, the Dubuque case is expressly and unqualifiedly accepted in State v. O'Neil, 147 Ia. 513, 526, 126 N. W. 454, 458 (1910)
(concurring opinion). Professor Frankfurter's conclusion that the Gelpcke case was not
accepted in Iowa seems, at best, doubtful; certainly it was premature.
(10) Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 (U. S. 1866): A bona fide purchaser of
bonds issued by Marshall County, Illinois, sued for reimbursement in a federal court.
An unreported state decision had held that these bonds were void since the election authorizing their issuance had been convened by the county court rather than the town
board of supervisors as the statute specifically required. Cook v. Supervisors of Marshall
County, 38 Ill. 44 (1865). In the Schenck case, the Supreme Court refused to follow
the Illinois precedent and held that, at least with regard to an innocent holder of the
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bonds, the county was estopped to deny that the election had been properly convened
because of the acquiescence and acts of the county authorities. There can be no doubt
that the Illinois courts continued to follow the Cook case. Curiously enough, it does
not appear that the Schenck case was subsequently urged in the Illinois courts. The
effect of the Schenck case in Illinois, therefore, cannot be properly evaluated. However
the Schenck case is the general weight of authority. See Note, 1915A L. R. A. 917
(1915). The foremost authority in the field unequivocally accepts the Schenck rationale.
2 DiLLON, MuNiciIAI CORpORATiONS 1195 (5th ed. 1911).
(11) Butz v. The City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869): 'Did a legislative
grant of special authority to a municipality to borrow money and pay for stock subscribed to a railroad corporation impliedly repeal, pro tanto, existing charter limitations
upon the rate of taxation? The Supreme Court found such an implication and contradicted the Iowa view. The case was rejected by the Iowa courts. Iowa R.R. Land
Co. v. The County of Sac, 39 Ia. 124, 137 (1874). The older authority of Clark Dodge &
Co. v. City of Davenport, 14 Ia. 494 (1863), has been consistently applied in the Iowa
courts. Judge Dillon seems to think, however, that the balance of authority in the United

States is with the Butz case. 1

DILLON,

MuIcn

.ALCoRpoRATrioNs 582 (5th ed. 1911).

(12) Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1869): Municipal authorities of the
City of Milwaukee, acting under the authority of the state, attempted to remove a wharf
which had been erected in navigable waters. In support of the right to do so, the authorities relied upon two grounds, one of which was that the one who had built the
wharf had no title to the soil. The Wisconsin court, in the earlier case of Yates v. Judd.
18 Wis. 126 (1864), had held that the builder had no title to the soil and refused to
enjoin an adjoining riparian owner from dredging the stream. In the Yates case, the
Supreme Court held that whether the plaintiff had title to the soil or not, he had certain
riparian rights and that these rights were property rights which could not be arbitrarily
impaired by the municipality or, a fortiori, by a private individual. Subsequently, in
Diedrich v. Northwestern Union R.R., 42 Wis. 248, 271, 272 (1877), Wisconsin rejected the rule handed down by the Supreme Court in Yates v. Milwaukee. However,
in McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427, 444, 55 N. W. 764, 770 (1893), the Wisconsin
courts began to fire away at their previous holdings. In Lathrop v. Racine, 119 Wis. 461,
473, 97 N. W. 192, 196 (1903), language in the Yates case was quoted and adopted.
Recently, in City of Milwaukee v. Millbrew, Inc., 240 Wis. 527, 533, 3 N. W. 2d 386, 390
(1942), Wisconsin accorded an additional accolade to Yates v. Milwaukee. There can
be no doubt that the tenor of the Wisconsin decisions since the Diedrich case has been
to follow the holding of Yates v. Milwaukee which the Diedrich decision purported to
reject. Furthermore, the Yates v. Milwaukee rule is generally accepted as the weight of
authority. See Note, 21 A. L. R. 207 (1922).
(13) Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873): The New York courts
had ruled that a driver traveling on a railroad with his flock for whom he had paid
and was in turn entitled to a "free pass," was a "gratuitous passenger." Accordingly,
the railroad could exculpate itself from liability for negligence. The Supreme Court in
the Lockwood case held that it was unlawful for a common carrier to stipulate for
exemption from fault liability. The Court said: "In deciding a case which involves a
question of such importance to the whole country, a question on which the Courts of
New York have expressed such diverse views and have so recently and with such slight
preponderancy of judicial suffrage, come to the conclusion that they have, we should not
feel satisfied without being able to place our decision upon grounds satisfactory to ourselves, and resting upon what we consider sound principles of law." Railroad Co.
v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357, 368 (1873). When the point arose again in the New York
courts, the Lockwood view was not adopted. Anderson v. Erie R.R., 223 N. Y. 277, 119
N. E. 557 (1918); Mynard v. Syracuse R.R., 71 N. Y. 180 (1877). Bissell v. N. Y.
Cent. R.R., 25 N. Y. 442 (1862), remained the New York view. However, the Lockwood case accords with the American weight of authority. See Notes, 1916A, L. R. A.
(ir. s.) 623; 5 R. C. L. 12 (1914). According to Shepard's citator, the Lockwood case
has been cited over 250 times in 45 jurisdictions. While it was impracticable to determine the exact effect of the case in each jurisdiction, it would seem a conservative
judgment that the case has been a very decisive factor in shaping the overwhelming
majority view in this country. The corollary judgment that its effect on uniformity
was substantial seems reasonable and probable inference. The "much discountenanced
New York view" is the subject of comment in a Note, 20 Copi= L. Q. 495, 497 (1935).
(14) Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546 (U. S. 1873): The facts were similar to Rowan v.
Runnels (app. 4 supra). The action was brought to enforce a promissory note given as
consideration for the sale of slaves in 1861. At that time the sale of slaves was lawful
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in Louisiana. In 1865, Louisiana adopted the Thirteenth Amendment; and in 1867, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that such contracts, whether partially executed or
completely executory, were void and could not be enforced in Louisiana courts. The
Supreme Court in Boyce v. Tabb refused to follow the Louisiana rule. (Although the
Court did not refer to it specifically, nor are the briefs of counsel available as an aid,
the probability is that the Louisiana case which the Court refused to follow was Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234 (1867).) It does not appear that the facts of Boyce
v. Tabb ever came again before the Louisiana courts; and therefore its effect on Louisiana
law is difficult to determine. However, this much is clear. At the time the Tabb case
came to the Supreme Court, the Louisiana case was a solitary one among the states of
the South. If Louisiana continued to favor the holding in Wainwright v. Bridges, and
we so assume, the holdings were contrary to those of neighbors, who, beset by the
same peculiarly local problem, decided in line with the ruling of Boyce v. Tabb. Alabama:
Hubbard v. Baker, 48 Ala. 491 (1872); McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48 (1870). Arkansas
Hastings v. White, 26 Ark. 308 (1870). Florida: McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1871)
Illinois: Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241 (1869). South Carolina: Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2
S. C. 283 (1870).
(15) Hough v. The Railroad, 100 U. S. 213 (1879): The facts in this case have already been discussed. See text at p. 501. The doctrine laid down by the Court in the
Hough case was accepted and followed by the Texas courts. Houston & T. C. Ry. v
Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334, 338 (1883); Texas M. R. Co. v. Whitemore, 58 Tex. 276, 288
(1883).
(16) Oates v. First National Bank, 100 U. S. 239 (1879): The facts were not unlike
those in Swift v. Tyson itself. Tvo questions were presented: (1) Is a bank a holder
in due course when it takes a promissory note as collateral security for a pre-existing debt
in consideration for an extension of time to pay the debt? (2) Does the fact that the
bank charged a usurious interest rate mitigate against it as a holder in due course? As
to the first question, Professor Frankfurter seems to suggest that the holding in the
Oates case, that the bank was a holder in due course, was in conflict with the law of
Alabama. Fenouille v. Hamilton, 35 Ala. 319 (1859). In truth, the point appears to have
been an open one in Alabama because there is no evidence in the Fcnouille case that an
extension of time was granted as additional consideration for the collateral security. See
BRITTON, HANDBoOK ON THE LAW OF B.Ls AND NOTES 369 (1943). In any event, § 25
of the N. I. L. codified the Oates rule. This would seem to settle the Alabama law even
in the Fenouille situation. On the point of usurious interest, the development of Alabama
law is puzzling. Compare Capital City Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 73 Ala. 558 (1883) with Wildsmuth v. Tracy, 80 Ala. 258 (1885). Compare Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390 (1848)
with Jones v. Moore, 212 Ala. 248, 251, 102 So. 200, 203 (1924) and Hoots v. Williams,
116 Ala. 372, 374, 22 So. 497, 498 (1897). Both the Hoots and Jones cases are directly contrary in spirit, if not the facts, to the Saltinarsh and Fenonille cases. The two more
recent decisions cite the Oates case as proper authority. The law of the Oates case seems
to be the law of Alabama today by the familiar process of piecemeal absorption.
(17)
The Railroad v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1881): The facts are also similar
to Swift v. Tyson. Sec. 25 of the N. I. L. changed the old rule of Coddington v. Bay, 20
Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822), in New York. For a complete discussion of the history of this
subject in New York, see BRoN,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF BILLS AND NOTES 380 (1943).

Kelso v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918), brought New York into harmony with
Swift v. Tyson and The Railroad v. National Bank, yet Professor Frankfurter implied
that the New York rule was still antithetic to Swift v. Tyson. Frankfurter, Distribution
of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 529
(1928).
(18) Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882): Seligman and Company, eastern
bankers, loaned money to a Missouri railroad and took bonds and a large block of the
railroad's stock as collateral security. The stock was to be held "in trust" and the
stock-transfer book of the corporation noted that Seligman held the shares "in escrow."
Seligman had voting privileges. He exercised his privilege by proxy on two occasions.
The railroad was adjudged a bankrupt, and a creditor sued Seligman for a pro rata share
of his debt by virtue of a Missouri statute which permitted such suits against stockholders of a defunct corporation. The statute expressly exempted those who held the
stock "in trust" or as "collateral security." In two earlier cases, the Missouri courts
held Seligman liable. The Supreme Court refused to follow these decisions and held that
as a matter of common law or under the statute Seligman could not be classified as a
stockholder. Five years later, another creditor brought suit against Seligman in the
Missouri courts. In Union Savings Ass'n v. Seligman, 92 Mo. 635, 643-44, 15 S. W. 630,
632 (1887), the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed its earlier holdings and expressly
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adopted the Burgess v. Seligman rule. There can be no clearer case of a subsequent
acceptance by a state court of a federal rule contrary to its own, and formulated in
direct opposition to it.
(19) Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 (1882): This case was similar to the Gelpcke v.
Dubuque situation. The courts of Illinois had ruled certain municipal bonds void on
the technical ground that the election authorizing the issuance of the bonds had been
presided over by a "moderator" instead of a "supervisor," "assessor" or "collector." Lippincott v. Pana, 92 Ill. 24 (1879). The bonds recited that the election bad been properly
held. They were countersigned by the proper town officials. The Supreme Court held
that as to a bona fide purchaser, the township was estopped from denying the validity
of the bonds. The precise question decided in the Bowler case never appears to have been
litigateid again in Illinois. Out-of-state holders naturally sued in the federal courts, and
apparently no resident of Illinois was hardy enough to press the argument of the Bowler
case upon an Illinois court. It is true that in subsequent cases involving injunctions against
tax assessments to pay off technically imperfect bonds, the Illinois courts held to their old
rule. However, in none of these cases was a bona fide purchaser involved. Choisser v.
People ex rel. Rude, 140 Ill. 21, 29 N. E. 546 (1892); Williams v. People ex rel. Wilson.
132 III. 574 (1890); Chicago & Iowa R. R. v. Mallory, 101 I1. 583 (1882). Perhaps
the adoption of the N. 1. L. in Illinois has foreclosed the question with respect to a
holder in due course. This seems a reasonable conclusion; and if it is true, then Illinois
is in line with the Bowler case. See BaxxroN, HANDtoor, ON THE LAW OF BILs AN NorEs
78 (1943). At any rate, the Bowler case is the decided weight of authority. See Notes,
1 A. L. R. 1535, 1536-39 (1919), 86 A. L. R. 1057, 1059 (1933), 19 R. C. L. 1015 (1917).
(20) Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680 (1886): The issue was the validity of bonds issued
by the municipality of Enfield, Illinois. The enabling statute gave this power to "any
village, city, county, or township." In Welch v. Post, 99 Ill. 471 (1881), the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that Enfield was a "town" and did not come within the terms
of the enabling statute. Consequently, the bonds were void even in the hands of bona
fide holders. The court brushed aside the prior case of Martin v. People ex rel Huck, 87
Ill. 524 (1877), which had ruled that a neighboring "town," Lake, was empowered to
issue bonds. The court did not undertake to overrule the Martin case and further admitted that its holding was incongruous because it granted the power to higher and lower
entities in the municipal hierarchy, but not to "towns." This was the confused state of the
law in Illinois when Enfield v. Jordan came before the United States Supreme Court. The
Court could not bring itself to follow the confused and irrational Welch opinion, It
justified its action on the basis that the Illinois decisions were inconsistent. The first
case to come before the Illinois courts subsequent to the Enfield case on this general
point was Longenecker v. Harvey, 142 Ill. 573, 32 N. E. 295 (1892). Although the
precise issue did not involve the validity of municipal bonds, the court cited and followed
the Martin case and held that the words "town" and "township" were synonymous in
Illinois law. The case did not refer to either the Welch or Enfield decisions. Next came
Phillips v. Town of Scales Mound, 195 Ill. 353, 358, 63 N. E. 180, 182 (1902), which
cited and followed both the Enfield and Martin cases. Later People ex rel. M. Mohlenbrock v. Pike, 197 Ill. 449, 452, 64 N. E. 393, 394 (1902), and Town of Cicero v. Hass,
244 Ill. 551, 553, 91 N. E. 574, 576 (1910), specifically followed the rationale of the
Longenecker, Martin, and Enfield cases. Although none of these later cases involved
bond issues, they are most persuasive that the terms "town" and "township" are used
interchangeably in modern Illinois law. If the Welch case arose today, the Illinois courts
would reach an opposite result. It can hardly be argued that the Enfield case did not
serve to bring the Martin view to full fruition in Illinois.
POSTSCRIPT
The Supreme Court of the United States on June 20, 1949 affirmed Cohen v. Beneficial
Loan Corp. 17 U. S. Law Week 430, and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse
Co., 17 U. S. Law Week 4564, and reversed J. S. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
17 U. S. Law Week 4565. Alone of all the Court Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote one dissent
to all three decisions saying in part: "There is sound historical reason for believing that
one of the purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy, when,
for at least some reasons of state policy, none would be available in the state courts.
It is the gloss which has been put upon the Erie ruling by later decisions, e.g. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 which in my opinion is being applied to extend the Erie
ruling far beyond its original purpose or intent, and in my judgment, with consequences
and implications seriously impairing Congress' power, within its proper sphere of action
to control this type of litigation in the federal courts."
These decisions spell the death of diversity litigation in the federal courts and compel
those courts to follow state procedure in diversity cases. The only hope for the future
lies in the dissent of Justice Rutledge. Let us believe that he is right and that his view
will one day triumph.

